21st century finance cannot do without a sound regulation of the OTC derivatives markets. by Jouyet, JP.
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  81
21st century ﬁ  nance cannot do without
a sound regulation of the OTC derivatives markets
OTC derivatives were quite rightly signaled out for their role in triggering and propagating the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. Admittedly, they can give rise to risk, regulatory arbitrage, complexity, and even ﬁ  nancial system 
instability. However, they also contribute to the ﬁ  nancing of the economy and to the smooth functioning of 
markets. Therefore, in order to retain the beneﬁ  ts and mitigate the risks, these products must be regulated 
appropriately. This regulation must not focus solely on prudential issues. The market regulator must play a role 
in establishing a renewed regulatory framework for these markets. The latter must be more transparent and 
their very organisation must evolve. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) has proposed 
a roadmap based on the three-fold approach of standardisation, clearing, and creation and registration of the 
corresponding market infrastructures. In addition, an even more ambitious overhaul should be considered of 
the national and European regulatory frameworks whose contours were designed before the explosion in 
derivatives trading volumes took place. They must now incorporate this new dimension of modern markets.
JEAN-PIERRE JOUYET
Chairman
Autorité des marchés ﬁ  nanciers
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T
he Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
calculates that notional amounts outstanding 
of derivatives contracts increased more than 
sevenfold in the decade between 1999 and 2009 
and now exceed USD 600 trillion. A niche market 
ten years ago, credit default swaps (CDSs) are 
now worth a notional USD 40 trillion, down from 
a pre-crisis peak of USD 60 trillion.1 By comparison, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated 
global GDP at approximately USD 60 trillion in 2008, 
while the World Federation of Exchanges put the 
global capitalisation of listed companies at around 
USD 50 trillion in 2009. Given how derivatives 
markets have expanded, coupled with the resulting 
risk that they could destabilise the ﬁ  nancial system, 
it is vital to regulate these markets appropriately. 
I| THE ROLE OF DERIVATIVES
  CONTRACTS AND MARKETS 
THESE ARE USEFUL MARKETS…
There is no question about the usefulness of 
derivatives contracts, which proved their worth 
long before the 21st century. Forward contracts, in 
which a seller and a buyer agree on the future price 
to be paid to exchange an asset, have existed for 
many years. Industrial ﬁ  rms have long used this 
type of products to manage currency risk as well as 
the risk of price ﬂ  uctuations for the raw materials 
they consume. By cushioning the risk of price 
swings, derivatives play a vital role in enabling these 
companies to plan their investments. This is the 
primary and most common role played by derivative 
instruments, that is to say a tool for transferring and 
managing risk. Today's sophisticated derivatives 
markets and products can be used to carefully 
manage a wide array of exposures, from currency, 
interest rate, credit and commodity risk, to equity 
market exposure and even the risk of volatility or 
correlation. The variety on offer gives companies 
access to a wide spectrum of products, which have 
become vital components of their ﬁ  nancial risk 
management processes. Financial institutions are 
naturally the heaviest users of derivatives contracts. 
Considerations such as leverage and the size of their 
balance sheets mean that managing ﬁ  nancial risk 
is an especially complex process for them, and 
derivative instruments are an extremely useful part 
of their toolbox.
But from simple devices for transferring risk, 
derivatives quickly evolved to take on more complex 
and innovative risk proﬁ   les. The ﬁ  rst  option 
derivatives revolutionised the way that ﬁ  nancial 
markets and companies work by making it possible 
not merely to agree on the future traded price of 
an asset, but also to take out protection, in return 
for a premium, against a decline (increase) in the 
price of that asset below (above) a given level. This 
insurance mechanism paved the way for new kinds 
of asymmetric risk proﬁ  les. Such instruments form 
the foundation, for example, of convertible bonds, 
which are corporate ﬁ   nance instruments with 
a hybrid risk/return conﬁ  guration that lie half-way 
between more conventional instruments such as 
equities and bonds. Similarly, without these types 
of instruments, it would not have been possible 
to offer capped variable rate mortgages, which allow 
borrowers to proﬁ  t partially from a decline in money 
market rates, while limiting risk in the event that the 
same rates go up. 
Derivatives also contribute to ﬁ  nancial  market 
liquidity. CDSs, which received heavy criticism 
amid the ﬁ  nancial crisis, provide liquidity to credit 
markets. Sometimes, they are more liquid than 
the same issuer’s bonds. While each bond issue is 
unique, the CDSs exposed to the issuer's credit risk 
may be standardised and fungible, and hence more 
liquid than individual bonds.
Finally, derivatives play a part in price formation 
by sending price signals to the market. This occurs, 
for example, when price formation mechanisms on 
cash markets do not provide adequate transparency 
on transaction prices. On some commodity markets, 
the main objective price benchmarks are derivatives 
prices, which some professionals even use to 
index the prices set in commercial contracts. On 
other markets, the price information provided by 
derivatives markets is used alongside information on 
cash transaction prices disseminated by specialised 
companies, such as Platts and Argus on oil markets.
1   The crisis forced the ﬁ  nancial industry to begin scaling back the volume of outstanding contracts.
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…IF PROPERLY REGULATED 
These examples are a non-exhaustive list of the 
ways in which derivatives markets play a useful 
role in delivering ﬁ  nancing and ensuring an orderly 
economy. But these markets must be correctly 
regulated. Because ﬁ  nancial market regulation has 
traditionally concentrated on conventional capital 
markets, i.e. equity markets, it has been slow 
to reﬂ  ect the effects of the explosion in outstanding 
derivatives.2 Without appropriate regulation, the use 
of derivatives could at best generate inefﬁ  ciencies, 
additional costs or arbitrage opportunities for market 
participants. At worst, they could be a source of 
systemic risk, which is what prompted Warren Buffett 
to dub them "ﬁ  nancial weapons of mass destruction" 
in 2002. What are the main potential risks that these 
products pose and that explain the determination 
to regulate them?
First, there are the risks of regulatory arbitrage. 
Derivatives can be used to transfer ﬁ  nancial 
value between two participants by disconnecting 
that value from the origin of the proﬁ  t or from 
the legal category of the corresponding physical 
transaction. They can even be embedded in other 
ﬁ  nancial products, such as investment funds or 
bonds, which are then called "structured," and 
which assume a completely different risk/reward 
proﬁ  le by incorporating the derivative component. 
For example, derivatives can be used to create 
a structured bond whose risk proﬁ  le replicates that 
of an investor on an equity market index. The legal 
nature of the security (bond) no longer bears any 
relation to its risk proﬁ  le or the associated income 
streams. Alternatively, they can enable equity 
investment funds to offer a money market return. 
There is thus a high risk that these sorts of products 
could be used for regulatory arbitrage. 
That arbitrage may have a tax focus. Contracts 
for difference3 did well in the United Kingdom in 
part because they enable investors to avoid stamp 
duty. Getting around marketing rules may be 
another objective. The restrictions on marketing 
a structured bond may differ from those that apply 
to an embedded derivative product. These products 
may also be used for accounting or prudential 
arbitrage: if a derivative exchanged between a bank 
and an insurance company is subject to different 
accounting or prudential rules, it could increase 
the earnings or reduce the capital requirements 
of each of the contracting parties. Meanwhile, the 
currency swap between Goldman Sachs and the 
Greek Treasury, which was recently reported in the 
media, illustrates how derivatives can be used to 
window-dress sovereign debt: the exchange rate used 
for the swap resulted in a large up-front payment 
from the bank to the Treasury, which apparently 
– the operative word – modiﬁ  ed Greece's debt. 
Of course, the scope for arbitrage options is 
increased in an international setting by the countless 
differences, tiny or otherwise, between domestic 
regulatory regimes. 
Another example of risks arising from the growing use 
of derivatives concerns the deep interconnections 
that these products have created between ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Whereas a trade on equity markets can 
be settled in three days, a derivatives contract might 
tie the parties for several years. The ﬂ  ip-side of the 
explosion in the outstanding amount of derivatives 
is that ﬁ   nancial institutions are increasingly 
interlinked; moreover, these linkages are based on 
contracts whose clauses or governing law may vary 
signiﬁ  cantly, making it extremely tricky to settle 
contracts when a large ﬁ  nancial institution4 fails. 
Among other things, central banks were created 
to ensure that the interconnections between 
ﬁ   nancial institutions resulting from interbank 
loans would not trigger a domino effect destroying 
entire swathes of the banking system following a 
failure by a major counterparty. With the rise of 
derivatives markets, these interconnections have 
been reestablished through a dense and complex 
network of derivatives transactions that have made 
the ﬁ  nancial system less resilient.
There is also the risk that there may be a poor 
assessment of the risk, proﬁ   le and value of 
derivatives. Derivative ﬁ  nancial products may be 
highly complex and awkward to price. Some expose 
the holder to extreme risks that are undetectable 
to conventional measurement tools. Consider for 
example that while some structured products may 
have had a AAA rating, which gave information about 
the probability of default according to a standard 
risk gauge, at the same time these products were 
2  For example, the UCITS Directive did not adjust the regulatory framework for European investment funds to accommodate derivatives until 2001. 
3  A derivative instrument that exposes the buyer to the price difference of an equity between the time when the derivative is arranged and when it is settled.
4  Such as Lehman Brothers.
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exposed to atypical risks. Whatever other criticisms 
may have been made concerning the rating of 
structured products, it is very worrying that ratings 
masked the risk of extreme losses linked to the high 
sensitivity of products to the default rate on their 
constituent loans. 
One ﬁ   nal example of the potential impact of 
derivatives concerns the fact that derivative 
products can also lead to anomalous outcomes 
in corporate ﬁ   nance transactions or corporate 
governance. Shareholders who hedge their exposure 
on derivatives markets no longer care about the 
company's performance, despite their duty to vote at 
general shareholder meetings, and creditors may not 
be interested in debt restructuring terms if they have 
hedged their risk with CDSs. The situation may be 
exacerbated if they have overhedged their exposure.
The use of derivatives is not the only source of tax 
and regulatory arbitrage or of systemic risk. But the 
complexity of these products explains partly why 
their impact is misunderstood by professionals and 
poorly (or belatedly) addressed by regulation. At the 
same time, their rapid growth has increased their 
potentially harmful effects. For example, although the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
covers derivative products, a number of its provisions 
draw on equity market concepts, such as "orders", 
that do not translate easily to derivatives markets, 
which have a fundamentally different structure. The 
same is true of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). 
In France, derivatives were only recently incorporated 
into the major holding notiﬁ  cation  framework 
through amendments to the general regulations of the 
securities regulator, the Autorité des marchés ﬁ  nanciers 
(AMF). In other words, rule-making is lagging market 
fundamentals. That gap must be closed, primarily 
by tackling OTC derivatives markets, which are the 
most opaque. The ﬁ  rst step is to prepare regulations 
that are tailored to OTC derivatives markets and 
to assign sufﬁ  cient resources to supervising these 
markets. Then, we need to conduct a comprehensive 
review of all existing rules and regulations with 
a view to integrating the potential impacts of 
derivative products.
2|  THE ROLE OF MARKET REGULATORS 
Current regulations and the resources deployed by 
regulators to supervise OTC derivatives markets 
have been shown to be inadequate. Working on 
the misconception that markets could organise 
themselves best without regulatory involvement and 
that the participation of professionals guaranteed 
the system's security and efﬁ  ciency,  regulators 
held back from markets that were nevertheless 
growing swiftly, leading in some cases to operational 
problems, misreading of risks by participants and 
areas of opacity. 
The crisis exposed the limitations of this approach 
and forced prudential and market regulators alike to 
introduce appropriate instruments to regulate and 
supervise these markets. 
BECAUSE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
ARE SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT …
While the "too-big-to-fail" debate has been going on 
for a long time – and has returned to the foreground 
since the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy – the question 
of "systemically important markets" has emerged 
since the crisis. The risk of a failure by a ﬁ  nancial 
institution has now been joined by the risk of 
a major market malfunction or stoppage. This issue 
is made more pressing because in a mark-to-market 
environment, the entire economic sphere relies on 
the prices supplied by markets.
How should systemically important markets be 
deﬁ   ned and identiﬁ   ed? Following a request by 
the G20, the IMF, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and the BIS proposed using the following criteria 
to determine the systemic importance of a 
ﬁ  nancial institution or market:5 size (the volume 
of ﬁ  nancial services supplied), substitutability (the 
extent to which other components of the ﬁ  nancial 
system can provide the same services in the event 
of a failure) and interconnectedness (linkages with 
5  IMF, FSB, BIS, Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors: "Guidance to assess the systemic importance of ﬁ  nancial institutions, markets and instruments: 
initial considerations", October 2009. See also the report on systemic risk submitted by Jean-François Lepetit to the Minister for the Economy, Industry and 
Employment, April 2010.
FSR14_JOUYET.indd   84 FSR14_JOUYET.indd   84 13/07/2010   09:08:29 13/07/2010   09:08:29ARTICLES
Jean-Pierre Jouyet: “21st century ﬁ  nance cannot do without a sound regulation of the OTC derivatives markets”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  85
other components of the ﬁ  nancial system). These 
three main criteria should be complemented with 
other contributing factors, such as complexity, 
leverage and liquidity risks, as well as, in the case of 
markets, the size and number of participants and the 
level of concentration. Conversely, the institutional 
framework may help to reduce these vulnerabilities, 
for example via clearing and settlement systems and 
the arrangements for handling crises and defaults. 
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets 
obviously meet many of these criteria, naturally 
because of their size and the interconnections 
that they create between participants, but also 
because the crisis exposed the interdependencies 
between these markets and other components of 
the ﬁ  nancial system. There are interdependencies 
between OTC derivatives markets and more liquid 
regulated markets (equity markets in practice), 
which were impacted during the crisis by problems 
on OTC markets;6 between derivatives markets and 
underlying markets, particularly as regards the 
provision of pricing information; between different 
segments of derivatives markets, in particular 
because the same participants are present on 
all of them; and between markets and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions themselves, ﬁ  rstly as regards ﬁ  nancing, 
managing and pricing risks and valuing assets, and 
secondly as regards the provision of liquidity by 
market makers.
…THEY NEED TO BE REGULATED AND SUPERVISED 
BY MARKET REGULATORS ALONGSIDE PRUDENTIAL 
REGULATORS 
Whereas central banks and prudential authorities 
have traditionally paid attention to ﬁ  nancial stability, 
the same is not true for market authorities, for whom 
this is a new concern. However, recognising that 
some markets may be systemically important means 
that market regulators must fully appropriate the 
objective of ﬁ  nancial stability alongside prudential 
regulators. Following recommendations issued by 
the G20, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) set out to strengthen its 
regulatory principles as regards the prevention of 
systemic risk. In its New Strategy Proposals published 
in 2009,7 the AMF once again named risk prevention 
and market supervision among its priorities. To meet 
these objectives, the AMF has to extend its scope 
of supervision to OTC markets (derivatives but also 
others, such as bonds) and step up monitoring of 
ﬁ  nancial innovation. In the early part of the year, 
the AMF created an in-house risk committee, 
which it will use to provide input for domestic, 
European and international work on monitoring 
macroeconomic risk and ﬁ  nancial stability, within 
the new Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk 
Board in France (established by the Banking and 
Financial Regulation Bill), the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) proposed by the European Union 
and the FSB at international level. Market regulators 
need to be suitably represented in these different 
forums given their growing involvement in the 
regulation of systemic risk.
As well as contributing to the objective of ﬁ  nancial 
stability, derivatives market regulation must not 
neglect its more traditional goals in the area of 
microeconomic regulation, such as ensuring orderly 
markets and improving market transparency. 
This twofold mission explains why the objectives 
(compliance with rules of conduct, prevention of 
market abuse, supervision of market practices) and 
the supervisory resources (transaction reporting 
system, market surveillance tools) used by the 
market regulator are both different from and 
complementary to those of prudential regulators. 
To properly discharge its twofold assignment, 
the market regulator must supervise all market 
components, including participants (intermediaries, 
managers, rating agencies, etc.) and their practices, 
e.g. short-selling, as well as products, trading and 
post-trade systems (including the trade repositories 
that are to be introduced shortly). 
These issues are currently under debate in a variety 
of forums. For European market regulators, the 
main work programme on OTC derivatives market 
regulation is undoubtedly that being taken forward 
6  Participants used the liquidity offered by regulated markets (the biggest ones being equity markets of course) to sell instruments, cover losses and meet margin calls 
on OTC markets. 
7  AMF's New Strategy Proposals, 29 June 2009. The operational measures derived from the plan were published in December 2009.
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by the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) in partnership with the European Commission 
to enhance the security and transparency of 
OTC derivatives markets. However, the reforms 
proposed within this framework will not be enough 
to complete the regulatory arrangements for these 
markets. The entire European legal framework will 
have to be overhauled.
3| CESR’S ROADMAP
After publishing its communication on policy 
actions to ensure efﬁ   cient, safe and sound 
derivatives markets, the European Commission 
assembled a working group in January 2010 
comprising representatives from Member States, 
CESR and the European Central Bank. The group 
was tasked with considering legislative policy 
guidelines for 2010 regarding OTC derivatives 
markets. It has concentrated on two main areas: 
reducing counterparty risk through centralised 
clearing of standardised contracts; and improving 
the transparency of OTC derivatives markets by 
gathering data in central data repositories.
To provide input to the Commission's work, CESR 
initiated discussions through its Post-Trade Standing 
Committee, which the AMF chairs. Dedicated task 
forces were created to make concrete proposals 
in three priority areas: a core set of requirements 
for clearing houses, trade repositories, and the 
conditions for implementing mandatory clearing of 
standardised derivatives contracts. 
Meanwhile, CESR's standing committee on 
secondary markets has also put forward proposals 
on the transparency and execution of transactions 
in ﬁ  nancial instruments other than equities.
It seems important at this point to explain where the 
AMF stands on the main options being studied by the 
different task forces and on the changes needed to 
reform the functioning of OTC derivatives markets.
PROMOTE WIDER USE OF CENTRAL CLEARING 
COUNTERPARTIES
Following the declarations made by the G20, various 
countries have launched legislative initiatives on 
the mandatory use of central counterparties for 
standardised OTC derivatives contracts. In addition 
to helping to reduce the net exposure of the overall 
ﬁ  nancial system, wider use of centralised clearing 
would modify the way in which risk is disseminated 
in the market. There are those who stress that 
bilateral management of counterparty risk – the 
model currently used on OTC derivatives markets – 
gives market participants valuable ﬂ  exibility in terms 
of managing risk. But within this framework, the 
level and quality of collateral are determined by 
counterparties using criteria that may vary from 
one institution to another. This creates the danger 
that the risks generated by the transactions may not 
be perfectly covered. The OTC derivatives market 
is particularly opaque, leaving it more exposed to 
less stringent risk management standards than the 
regulator-vetted standards applied by a central clearing 
counterparty. Bilateral management of counterparty 
risk also contributes to a misreading of aggregate risk 
and the distribution of risk between counterparties. 
In addition, in the bilateral risk management model, 
a market participant's default may be problematic. 
Every participant has to work directly with the 
administrator of the failed company to deal with 
dishonoured contracts, which increases uncertainty 
over the settlement terms for each counterparty of 
the failed participant. The market as a whole may 
refuse or be reluctant to sign new contracts with 
participants that have potential exposure to the failed 
party; in extreme market conditions, such reluctance 
to trade may spread to the wider market, which then 
becomes illiquid.
By contrast, the centralised clearing model makes it 
possible to establish harmonised basic requirements 
for managing risk and calculating margins. All 
clearing house members thus beneﬁ  t from rigorous 
risk management practices, as well as reduced 
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overall exposure to the central clearer. In the event 
of a default by a clearing member, the central 
counterparty continues to honour the contracts that 
it has cleared vis-à-vis other members by drawing 
on the ﬁ  nancial resources at its disposal, starting 
with the margin provided by the failed member, 
followed if need be by the member's payments 
into the clearing fund, followed by other clearing 
members' contributions to the fund, followed lastly 
by the capital of the clearing house itself. The 
central counterparty will manage the dishonoured 
commitments of the defaulting member directly 
with the bankruptcy administrator, in a centralised 
manner. Each of these layers of protection is 
an opportunity to limit the risk that a failure by 
a ﬁ  nancial institution could contaminate the rest 
of the market or ﬁ  nancial system. This makes the 
case for a broad extension of the scope of clearing to 
include OTC-traded derivative instruments. 
However, the central counterparty then by deﬁ  nition 
becomes the counterparty of each market participant. 
It concentrates risks, which may be viewed as 
a risk factor in and of itself. Each participant has 
greater exposure to the clearing house alone than 
it would have otherwise had to individual bilateral 
counterparties. But this argument can be tempered 
by the quality of risk management arrangements 
established by the central counterparty and required 
by the regulations. For this reason, it is vital to have 
strict standards to ensure the resilience of central 
counterparties, but also to limit the opportunities 
for regulatory arbitrage created by the regulations of 
these institutions, which will lie at the heart of the 
framework for supervising systemic risk. For this, 
three things are needed. 
First, the regulation of central counterparties 
needs to be based on standards that guarantee 
the soundness of these entities by giving them 
credit-institution status. European legislative 
provisions should set requirements for operational 
resilience, covering areas such as adequate technical 
and human resources, supervision of outsourced 
functions, and continuity and recovery plans. 
To ensure ﬁ  nancial and/or legal resilience, provision 
must be made to guarantee adequate ﬁ  nancial 
resources to cover the risks to which central 
counterparties are exposed. Risk management 
provisions must include measures to ensure prudent 
management of the collateral posted by members 
and ensure the existence of robust procedures to 
manage a member default.
Second, the future European supervisory authorities 
must be assigned broad powers to regulate clearing 
houses, to avoid any risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
While national regulators should be responsible 
for day-to-day supervision (because they have 
a local presence and are thus more responsive), 
the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
should manage the authorisation process and have 
the right to ask to review the situation of central 
counterparties and the way they are operated and 
supervised. These authorities should also be at the 
core of any future process for recognising clearing 
houses outside Europe. 
Third, locating central counterparties in the 
monetary area of the currency of the contracts that 
they clear will help to promote sound clearing houses 
by providing access to central bank reﬁ  nancing 
facilities (intraday and overnight liquidity). 
It will of course be necessary to determine the scope 
of the requirement to clear in terms of products 
and participants because this will determine the 
impact of the principle of centralised clearing on 
reducing counterparty risk. ESMA should play 
a key role in authorising products to be cleared 
and in monitoring the thresholds for contracts 
cleared. In this context, the AMF is participating 
actively in CESR's work on formulating a process 
for determining the requirement to clear. The 
European Commission wanted to leave central 
counterparties to decide which contracts should 
be subject to mandatory clearing; they would 
then apply to the national authorities to authorise 
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clearing for the contracts in question and send 
that information to ESMA. The AMF, like the other 
French ﬁ  nancial regulators, would prefer ESMA, 
in partnership with the ESRB, to be responsible for 
identifying contracts that it feels should be subject to 
mandatory clearing and, further out, for encouraging 
business offers by European clearing houses to 
process these contracts. CESR is also looking at 
criteria for determining the requirement to clear, 
such as contract standardisation, liquidity and the 
availability of sufﬁ  ciently regular and reliable market 
data to calculate the collateral provided to the clearing 
house. While the principle of customised OTC-traded 
derivatives contracts designed to meet the speciﬁ  c 
risk hedging requirements of companies is accepted, 
a signiﬁ  cant portion of transactions on derivatives 
markets of all kinds could be steered towards central 
counterparties. A simple mechanism would provide 
an incentive: different capital requirements could 
be set depending on whether the derivative goes 
through a clearing house.
SET UP CENTRAL DATA REPOSITORIES 
FOR ALL TRADES 
The roadmap set out in the G20 declarations 
of September 2009 and taken up by the 
European Council on 2 December 2009 provided 
for the creation of trade repositories. These 
are destined to play a key role by recording 
all transactions to provide transparency on 
OTC derivatives markets. At present, regulators 
cannot obtain unconditional, immediate 
information about trades on derivatives markets. 
This situation needs to change.
The initial discussions are dealing with deﬁ  ning 
the objectives assigned to the repositories. 
Regulators agree that they should be involved in 
macro-supervision (i.e. supervision of participant 
positions), but the AMF is lobbying for a more 
ambitious option. If the disclosures provided by 
ﬁ  nancial institutions are sufﬁ  ciently detailed, the 
trades recorded in the repositories could also be used 
for micro-supervision, to detect market abuse. The 
trade repository model that currently seems to be 
favoured by professionals would be suitable only for 
macro-supervision and would not therefore address 
the needs of market regulators.
As regards the location of these repositories, it seems 
inevitable that they should have to be based in Europe. 
This would be the only way to guarantee automatic 
access to data formatted according to the needs of local 
regulators. Otherwise, Europe would have to comply 
with the access conditions of trade repositories 
regulated by third parties, which would amount 
to surrendering sovereignty. Obviously, European 
regulatory authorities would have to be responsible 
for authorising and supervising these entities, whether 
they operate within Europe or globally.
MOVE FORWARD CAUTIOUSLY ON INTEROPERABILITY 
In 2007 the Code of Conduct for Clearing and 
Settlement introduced by European Commissioner 
Charlie McCreevy recommended interoperability 
between clearing and settlement systems. This was 
expected to bring about increased competition, lower 
prices and ultimately market consolidation. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the code 
applied solely to equity markets (and moreover has 
not delivered on all its promises). Because all market 
regulators have come to the same conclusion, 
namely that interoperability, which requires 
systems to be interlinked, markedly increases risk 
through the potential for contagion. Thus, while the 
interoperability of cash markets offers undeniable 
advantages in terms of competition and costs for 
market participants, the products on these markets 
are simple and settlement timeframes are fairly short. 
When it comes to derivative instruments, which have 
more complex risk proﬁ  les and longer settlement 
times, the risks associated with interoperability 
increase. LCH Clearnet's regulators conducted 
an in-depth analysis of the impact of individual 
linkages between clearing houses and concluded 
that systemic risk rises sharply with an increase in 
the interconnectedness of clearing houses (owing to 
the risks of contagion). In their analysis, they found 
that the existence of a single link increases liquidity, 
operational, legal and settlement risk. Multiple 
links would additionally make it possible for risk 
to spread to the entire network of clearing houses, 
with even an greater danger if domestic regulations 
are incompatible. At this stage, the increased risk 
that would come with mandatory interoperability is 
an argument against introducing such a regime for 
derivatives clearing systems.
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ENCOURAGE DERIVATIVES TRADING TO MOVE 
TO ORGANISED TRADING PLATFORMS
Setting aside the vital question of the mandatory 
clearing of derivative instruments, it is important in 
the post-crisis period to consider which methods and 
venues are appropriate for executing transactions 
in derivative products. The recommendations by 
the G20 and the European Commission are clear in 
this regard: as part of establishing efﬁ  cient, sound 
derivatives markets, standardised derivatives should 
be traded on organised platforms (regulated markets 
and multilateral trading facilities or MTFs in 
MiFID-speak) whenever possible. The markets 
that were structured around organised and active 
platforms were among those that weathered the 
crisis most successfully: their liquidity never 
dried up, even though the cost of liquidity was 
a substantial decline in the trading value of assets. 
CESR is looking into this issue and has set up 
an ad hoc working group. 
The issue of trading derivative instruments on 
organised platforms once again raises the question 
of standardisation. Much work is being done in this 
area, particularly by industry (including ISDA).8 The 
beneﬁ  ts and limits of trading on organised platforms 
vary depending on the types of instrument and 
participants (notably on their level of sophistication). 
But in all cases, trading on organised multilateral 
facilities makes it possible to ensure pre- and 
post-trade market transparency in the most efﬁ  cient 
way that we know. The beneﬁ  ts in terms of the 
quality of the price discovery and formation process, 
and in terms of disseminating prices to the market, 
are immediate and use familiar, well controlled 
mechanisms. Trading on organised platforms as 
deﬁ  ned under MiFID is also a way to ensure equal 
market access, a high level of operational efﬁ  ciency, 
and structured monitoring of the execution process 
(trade conﬁ  rmation, straight-through processing). 
Furthermore, experience shows that trade disclosures 
to regulators (used for supervisory purposes to detect 
market abuse) are vastly more reliable when done 
directly by a few organised platforms rather than 
by a myriad market participants. By capitalising on 
a tried and tested model and by beneﬁ  ting from its 
advantages without major investment, derivatives 
trading on multilateral platforms can be used 
to strengthen the transparency and soundness 
of derivatives markets, to the beneﬁ  t of market 
participants and regulators alike. There have to 
be exceptions of course, such as for large blocks of 
contracts that could affect the market, but these 
should be special cases that are governed by the 
regulations, provided the contracts in question are 
sufﬁ  ciently standardisable and liquid.
MAKE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS MORE TRANSPARENT
Given that mandatory and harmonised pre- and 
post-trade transparency rules currently apply only 
to equities in Europe, the scheduled review of 
MiFID should be the opportunity to consider the 
issue of transparency for other types of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments and to analyse the beneﬁ  ts  and 
impacts, particularly for derivatives contracts. Only 
appropriate transparency rules that have been 
tailored to the speciﬁ  c features of these markets will 
prevent the problems created by the opacity of prices 
and transactions in these products. Recent events on 
sovereign debt markets provide evidence, if more 
were required, of the need to extend the scope of 
post-trade transparency to derivatives, even though 
the requirements for implementing transparency 
must naturally be adjusted to each type of market. 
Pre-trade transparency provides all participants with 
the same level of information about orders offered, 
thus enhancing the quality of the price formation 
process. Post-trade transparency gives the market an 
exhaustive view of the trades that have been carried 
out, which is needed to value products and comply 
with best execution requirements.
The AMF is participating actively in discussions 
between European regulators on the transparency 
of non-equity markets (bonds, structured products, 
derivatives contracts) within CESR's standing 
committee on secondary markets. After two reports 
on the topic published in 2007 and 2009 respectively, 
the committee of regulators is now considering the 
deﬁ  nition of the appropriate level of transparency 
for these different types of products. In their 
report of July 2009,9 European regulators stressed 
the need to enhance transparency and establish 
a post-trade transparency regime for credit derivatives 
markets, and particularly for CDS. Considering that 
industry-led initiatives in this area had fallen short, 
8  International Swaps and Derivatives Association. 
9  "Transparency of corporate bond, structured ﬁ  nance product and credit derivatives markets", CESR/09-348, 10 July 2009.
FSR14_JOUYET.indd   89 FSR14_JOUYET.indd   89 13/07/2010   09:08:30 13/07/2010   09:08:30ARTICLES
Jean-Pierre Jouyet: “21st century ﬁ  nance cannot do without a sound regulation of the OTC derivatives markets”
90  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010
regulators decided that a mandatory European-level 
post-trade transparency regime would deliver 
signiﬁ  cant  beneﬁ   ts. And indeed, a harmonised 
transparency regime going beyond the national 
initiatives currently allowed under MiFID would 
make it possible to measure the level of credit 
risk transfers and promote liquidity on these 
markets, which provide a pricing yardstick for 
other ﬁ   nancial instruments. CESR therefore 
recommended that the European Commission 
legislate to this effect and establish a mandatory 
and appropriate post-trade transparency regime 
for derivatives markets. Today, the committee 
is working on a more accurate deﬁ  nition of the 
appropriate level of transparency for these products. 
It recently published a new consultation paper that 
proposes setting the parameters for an appropriate 
post-trade transparency regime for non-equity 
markets, notably the CDS market, including which 
information to publish and within what timeframe. 
The paper also asks a number of open questions 
in a bid to gauge the appropriate level of pre- and 
post-trade transparency on other derivatives 
markets, including interest, equity, currency and 
commodity derivatives markets. The Commission 
will use these recommendations as a basis for its 
deliberations during the MiFID review. 
But aside from the question of reforming MiFID, 
a more ambitious post-trade transparency regime 
is possible. Why not use the trade repositories to 
provide all market participants with information 
about the terms on which trades are carried out? 
4| A  BROADER OVERHAUL
  OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS
  REGULATION AND A NEW KIND OF
  GOVERNANCE FOR OTC MARKETS 
Beyond the current work being done with the 
speciﬁ  c goal of regulating OTC derivatives markets 
more effectively, it is important to make sure that the 
overall European legislative framework fully reﬂ  ects 
the presence of derivatives markets, notably by 
ensuring that market abuse on derivatives markets 
10  CESR Consultation on guidance to report transactions on OTC derivative instruments, 09-987, January 2010.
11  For now, only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain collect data on transactions on OTC-traded derivatives. 
does not go unpunished. More generally, current 
developments in the regulation of OTC derivatives 
markets should be extended to commodity 
derivatives markets, and should lead to a broader 
reﬂ  ection on the regulatory principles to be applied 
to OTC markets.
FIGHTING MARKET ABUSE 
To be effective on these markets, regulators must 
have access to information on trades on OTC 
derivatives markets so that they can detect cases of 
market abuse and punish breaches. Without waiting 
for the creation of European and international 
trade repositories and Europe’s post-trade 
legislation, European regulators have already 
agreed to exchange data on OTC trades through the 
Transaction Reporting Exchange  Mechanism (TREM) 
introduced under MiFID for equities. CESR held 
a consultation on the arrangements for reporting 
these transactions in the early part of the year,10 
and the committee will release ﬁ  nal guidelines 
in summer 2010. CESR will also propose to the 
Commission that, as part of the MiFID review, it 
should take away the option given to Member States 
of not requiring transactions in ﬁ  nancial instruments 
other than equities to be reported, instead making 
such disclosures mandatory.11 The instruments 
covered by the reporting arrangements are 
derivatives whose underlyings have been admitted 
to trading on a regulated market. In other words, 
interest rate, currency and commodity derivatives 
are excluded at this stage. 
The Market Abuse Directive, which provides 
appropriate means of deterrence and penalties 
to combat certain types of behaviour, such as 
insider trading and market manipulation, also 
needs to be reviewed. Revising MAD will provide 
an opportunity to clarify the framework applicable 
to transactions on OTC derivatives markets. The 
review will look at the scope of markets and 
ﬁ  nancial instruments covered by MAD, but it 
could also consider questions that are speciﬁ  c 
to certain markets, such as the disclosure of 
privileged information on commodity markets, 
in connection with current discussions on 
sector regulation. 
FSR14_JOUYET.indd   90 FSR14_JOUYET.indd   90 13/07/2010   09:08:30 13/07/2010   09:08:30ARTICLES
Jean-Pierre Jouyet: “21st century ﬁ  nance cannot do without a sound regulation of the OTC derivatives markets”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  91
12  In volume terms.
REGULATING COMMODITY DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
Commodity derivatives also need to be included in 
initiatives to make derivatives markets more secure, 
while taking account of their speciﬁ  c qualities.
Commodity derivatives markets are of vital 
importance to farming and to certain sectors of 
industry. Accordingly, it is important to ensure 
that they function properly, including by creating 
an incentive to standardise the most common 
OTC contracts as far as possible so that they can be 
cleared and traded on organised markets. 
At the same time, OTC commodity derivatives present 
a challenge to standardisation because of the wide 
diversity of underlyings both in terms of physical 
products (from crude oil to cereals) and geographical 
location (which determines transport costs). These 
qualities are behind the difﬁ  culties inherent in 
supervising these markets, which are diverse, 
decentralised and hence often non-transparent. 
The need to cover derivatives markets as well as, 
where possible, related physical markets, further 
complicates matters; yet dual supervision is vital to 
detect and punish abuse, especially manipulation.
Given the current legal and technical powers of the 
ﬁ  nancial regulator, the supervision of commodity 
derivatives markets also presents challenges from 
an institutional architecture perspective. In some 
cases, the ﬁ  nancial regulator will have to cooperate 
with a sector regulator that may have more or less 
extensive powers over the underlying physical 
markets (electricity and gas for example). In other 
instances (oil, metals, etc.), there is no regulator 
as such in Europe, but various public authorities 
(ministry, competition authority) have information 
about the functioning of physical markets. Whatever 
the situation, the challenge is to take a pragmatic 
approach to deﬁ   ning the boundaries of each 
regulator's powers and the terms for cooperation 
between the market regulator and other authorities 
to ensure that the market in question is properly 
supervised.
The third challenge involves developing these 
markets to address existing or future hedging 
needs of economic agents. This is particularly 
evident in farming, where changes to the 
Common Agricultural  Policy will require sustained 
and coordinated efforts to make sure that farmers 
and food industries have access to appropriate and 
effective risk management tools. Organised and 
OTC derivatives markets alone cannot control the 
risks that are part of farming, but they should play 
their role in this regard to the full. The AMF will 
contribute to the development of these markets, 
while keeping a close watch to ensure their integrity, 
for the beneﬁ  t of all participants.
A NEW KIND OF GOVERNANCE FOR OTC MARKETS
MiFID was primarily designed to reﬂ  ect the way 
that equity markets function. Some provisions, 
such as those pertaining to key MiFID concepts 
such as "orders" and "best execution", are not easily 
applied to OTC derivatives markets. The MiFID 
review should be the opportunity to clarify the 
way that certain provisions apply to markets in 
instruments other than equities. The crisis has 
shown that we have to reassess client categorisations 
to limit the risk that complex OTC-traded products 
might be improperly marketed (information gaps, 
unsuitable products). 
But beyond the question of adapting the directive 
to OTC derivatives markets, it is necessary to 
take a deeper look at market developments, and 
particularly the place of OTC markets within the 
ﬁ  nancial system. For although discussions are now 
being held (thanks to impetus from the G20) on 
mandatory clearing for OTC derivatives and their 
trading on organised platforms where possible, 
the momentum is in the other direction in equity 
securities – a situation that is seemingly causing little 
fuss for now. MiFID's entry into force three years 
ago was accompanied by a sharp increase in OTC 
transactions. While there may be questions over the 
quality of the statistics published on these trades, 
it is generally accepted that approximately 40% of 
all transactions12 in equities admitted to regulated 
markets in the European Economic Area are 
OTC, with the remaining 60% being divided 
between regulated markets and MTFs. These 
OTC transactions, which are not subject to any 
pre-trade transparency requirements, are generally 
published in real time but publication delays of up 
to three days are possible when an intermediary 
executes a client order on own account. 
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While preparations for establishing a coherent regulatory framework for derivatives markets are underway 
thanks to impetus from the G20, few proposals have been translated into legal or regulatory provisions 
and many technical details have yet to be hammered out. The political pressure must be kept up, 
to prevent the substance of these proposed rules and regulations from being gradually removed during 
the drafting process. This is a challenge for all regulators, who have a shared interest in making parallel, 
if not convergent, progress on this issue, to avoid discrepancies in regulation that would be detrimental 
to the most virtuous ﬁ  nancial centres.
To the extent that MiFID deﬁ   nes OTC trades 
by default only, i.e. as transactions that are not 
carried out on regulated markets or MTFs, these 
transactions cover a diverse range of situations, 
from the cash leg of a transaction with a derivative 
component to the simple matching of client orders 
within banks' internal crossing networks. 
The forthcoming MiFID review should provide an 
opportunity to establish a framework for some of 
these transactions, notably by creating a proper 
status for crossing networks. The origin of certain 
types of OTC transactions should also be better 
identiﬁ  ed when they are published. However, unless 
we are willing to accept that regulation is always 
made in hindsight, as new forms of OTC trading 
emerge we have to be more ambitious if we want to 
do a better job of managing the growing share of these 
OTC transactions. Negotiators could work towards 
a "positive" deﬁ  nition of what is meant by OTC, which 
could cover only transactions that by virtue of their 
speciﬁ  c characteristics and purely bilateral nature 
would never be traded on platforms or contribute to 
the price discovery mechanism. Block trades might 
be an example. For it is by directing the maximum 
number of orders to transparent trading venues that 
we will enhance the quality of the price discovery 
and formation mechanism. And the quality of the 
price formation process is what determines the 
efﬁ  ciency of derivatives and cash markets alike.
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